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As the executive agent for ammunition, the Army manages the arsenals and plants 
that produce conventional ammunition for the Department of Defense.  This industrial 
base must be able to manufacture a wide range of ammunition and ordnance items.  In 
peacetime, the Army tests new rounds, makes training rounds, and manufactures rounds 
or components for war reserves, stockpile maintenance and upgrades.  The Army must 
also manage and maintain capacity to replenish ammunition consumed by major theater 
wars without expanding the industrial base.  The combined organic and inorganic 
industrial base can meet current requirements, but parts are becoming obsolete, and are 
expensive to operate.  To improve efficiency and reduce per-unit costs while maintaining 
strategic control of this key defense capability, the Army is seeking to reconfigure 
facilities, and stabilize production rates.  The Army realizes that the industrial base 
structure has to change.  This thesis provides a prototypic decision support model that 
captures the essence of their problem by optimizing transition actions while satisfying 
complicated long-term constraints on resources, management, and capacity.  The model 
suggests yearly decisions for a planning horizon of a decade or more, and is demonstrated 
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The American government built its first Army ordnance facilities after the 
Revolutionary War.  Congress allocated funds for arsenals to make the United States self-
sufficient.  These efforts resumed with the beginning of World War I, but even then U.S. 
forces still had to use ammunition manufactured outside the continental United States 
(CONUS).  Although 32 ammunition plants had been constructed by the end of World 
War I, World War II brought even more massive expansion.  Army arsenals and Army 
Ammunition Plants (AAPs) have served the United States well for over two hundred 
years, sustaining the readiness and responsiveness of its armed forces.  Of facilities built 
after the Revolutionary War and during World Wars I and II, 16 are still open today. 
As the DOD’s executive agent for ammunition, it is the U.S. Army’s 
responsibility to manage the conventional ammunition production base that meets 
peacetime demands of the armed services and maintains capacity to replenish wartime 
consumption.  The Army’s organic and inorganic production base capacity is far in 
excess of any anticipated requirement.  This report examines part of the organic base. 
Since the end of the Cold War, workload and employment at two remaining 
arsenals and surviving AAPs have declined substantially, and they currently operate at a 
fraction of capacity; per-unit costs have increased as fixed costs have been allocated 
among diminished production quantities.  Personnel reductions have not kept pace with 
workload reductions. 
The Army production base can continue to meet current requirements, but at what 
cost?  Facing a limited budget, it is not likely that the Army will invest in advanced, 
flexible munitions manufacturing technology required for the production base, leading to 
further obsolescence of the base and increasing costs.  The existing base is becoming 
obsolete, and is not cheap.  The risk of not being able to meet replenishment requirements 
is also increasing.   
So, the problem at hand is to reconfigure Army ammunition production facilities, 
stabilize production rates, and perhaps attract private investment in new technology.  
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Ammunition is critical to the military, and it has unique classes of commodity 
groups that are hazardous to manufacture.  The structure of the ammunition industrial 
base includes a combination of Government Owned Government Operated (GOGO) 
plants; Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) plants; and Contractor Owned 
Contractor Operated (COCO) plants.  This combination of commercial (inorganic) and 
Army (organic) industrial base segments represents the National Technology and 
Industrial Base (NTIB) infrastructure and is the source of all materiel needed by the DOD 
to carry out its peacetime and replenishment responsibilities in support of the National 
Military Strategy (NMS).  The Army-managed industrial base infrastructure is a resource 
to satisfy the materiel needs of all US forces in a timely manner, with reliable, 
maintainable, and affordable materiel. 
The vision of the Army Chief of Staff for a flexible, light, responsive force and 
the need to fund this transformation has put increasing pressure on all commands, 
including Army Materiel Command (AMC), to reduce its operating costs.  The Army 
cannot continue to afford the full operational capability of the AAPs and arsenals while 
maintaining significant amounts of underutilized capacity. 
In peacetime, the industrial base must develop new rounds for testing; 
manufacture special training rounds; and make existing rounds or components for war 
reserves, stockpile maintenance or upgrades.  Further, there must be capacity to make 
ammunition and ordnance items to replenish stocks consumed during major theater of 
wars (MTWs). 
Changing the governance of the industrial base is a possible approach to 
improving the manufacture of ammunition and ordnance items and requires consideration 
of many complex issues. 
Economics and politics constrain the options available to maintain, close, or 
change the management of GOGO, GOCO, and COCO facilities.  Base realignments and 
closures incur significant relocation costs for both equipment and personnel; property and 
equipment transfers are costly and time consuming.  These decisions are influenced by 
several factors, including the complexity and number of actions that the Army can 
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implement at any one time, the cost of actions, including environmental remediation, and 
the degree of control the Army wants to exercise over the resulting ammunition 
infrastructure. 
Prior studies share the common goal of reducing infrastructure cost of a set of 
installations.  However, none of them has addressed Army arsenals and AAP installation 
types, or the subject of minimizing the unutilized capacity at these facilities. 
The work reported in this thesis derives from a tasking that the Deputy Under 
Secretary of the Army for Operations Research gave the Center for Army Analysis 
(CAA) to review an ongoing study (PBD407) that examines the reorganization of the 
Army’s ammunition production base.  As part of CAA’s review, they recommended to 
the PBD407 oversight, the Director of Force Development (Logistics), that this work be 
accomplished to augment PBD407.  CAA is also tasked with the G3’s Stationing of the 
Army for Transformation analysis, which this effort may also assist in. 
We favor a prescriptive optimization model because the Army has a successful 
history of such models for base closing and realignment and other related issues.  The 
Army understands and accepts the advantages of optimization.  We want to learn the best 
way to deal with the management of the ammunition industrial base.  Spreadsheet 
analysis is an option, but it is descriptive and requires that we suggest the alternate 
solutions to be evaluated in which case we never know whether there are better solutions 
left unexamined. 
We develop a flexible decision support tool that schedules the way and the rate 
that actions should be carried out to transition government ammunition facilities between 
modes of operation while satisfying complicated long-term constraints on resources and 
oversight.  This decision support tool minimizes fixed and variable possession and 
operating costs of Army arsenals and Army Ammunition Plants, meeting the 
replenishment requirements and the demand for peacetime production of ammunition and 
ordnance items. 
We introduce a mixed integer programming model developed as an aggregated 
optimization-based decision support system that will suggest optimal yearly schedules of 
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actions that satisfy exogenous constraints on budget, management, and capacity over a 
planning horizon of a decade or longer. 
We consider reconfiguration of 16 different installations, of which, two are 
GOGO “hard iron” arsenals that manufacture ordnance items, three are GOGO AAPs, 
and 11 are GOCO AAPs. Of the GOCO AAPs, five are inactive.  The rest of these 
installations are active. 
We generate synthetic and thus unclassified data randomly but systematically for 
a proof prototype for a total of 16 different installations, 34 structures, 19 process centers, 
and nine process types for a 10-year horizon. 
We plan by year because the DOD and the Army also budget and plan by year.  
We consider a 10-year planning horizon because the cost implications of near-term 
decisions extend at least that far into the future.  We choose modes of operation in our 
model to reflect the current industrial base management modes and the alternatives at 
hand. 
The lexicon we use to represent the industrial base includes a set of 
“installations”, areas within these devoted to similar activities we call “structures”, and 
these structures contain “process centers” that perform particular manufacturing tasks. 
We demonstrate the model for two different scenarios, a full system optimization 
model and a more reasonable single-issue scenario.  The full model suggests actions for 
every installation.  The single-issue scenario examines the most problematic portion of 
ammunition installations: load, assemble, and pack (LAP) process centers and the 
installations housing them. 
We seek year-by-year operating modes for each installation, structure and process 
center.  A schedule that defines which installations, structures or process centers are 
running (in any mode of operation), which ones are disposed, and which process centers 
will be moved to which receiving structures and installations is specified for every year 
for a 10-year period of time. 
 xx
For every planned year, we determine which open and working process center 
will have to work how many shifts to accomplish its part of the manufacturing of 
required materiel.  We also determine the estimated costs to perform all these changes. 
We have reviewed the model with LTC Bill Tarantino at the Center for Army 
Analysis.  LTC Tarantino believes the model introduced here will potentially be used to 
support the Army’s Industrial Base Review led by the Army Material Command, CAA's 
























































A. SHORT HISTORY OF U.S. ARMY AMMUNITION PRODUCTION BASE  
It was not until after the Revolutionary War that the new American government 
built its first Army ordnance facilities to satisfy its own needs for munitions should the 
requirement arise again to mobilize.  Congress allocated funds for arsenals to make the 
United States self-sufficient.  These efforts resumed with the beginning of World War I, 
but even then U.S. forces still had to use ammunition manufactured outside the 
continental United States (CONUS).  Although 32 ammunition plants had been 
constructed by the end of World War I, World War II brought massive expansion.  
Congress authorized the construction of 112 plants, 84 of which were subsequently built.  
In 1944, the peak production year, the U.S. produced more ammunition than all of its 
enemies and allies combined [Sawyer, 1993].  Army arsenals and Army Ammunition 
Plants (AAPs) have served the United States well for over 200 years, sustaining the 
readiness and responsiveness of its armed forces.  Of facilities built after the 
Revolutionary War and during World Wars I and II, 16 are still open today (See Figure 1 


















Figure 1.   Geographic Locations of U.S. Army Arsenals and Ammunition Plants 
This map shows the geographic locations of the 16 Army arsenals and ammunition plants 
studied by this thesis, which are spread throughout the continental United States. 
[Background map from University of Texas Library on Line, 2002] 
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In this thesis we use the terms “facility” and “installation” interchangeably for 
arsenals and AAPs.  Each structure is constituted by a set of functionally related 
buildings and/or an area of land housed by an installation.  Process centers within a 
structure manufacture ammunition and ordnance items of a specific type. 
 
B. OPERATING THE AMMUNITION PRODUCTION BASE AT REDUCED 
LEVELS 
The U.S. Army manages a conventional ammunition production base with dual 
missions: fill armed services peacetime demands for training and also maintain capacity 
to replenish war consumption [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998].  The Army’s large current 
production base is far in excess of any anticipated requirement. 
Since the end of the Cold War, workload and employment at two remaining 
arsenals and surviving AAPs have declined substantially, and they currently operate at a 
fraction of capacity; per-unit costs have increased as fixed costs have been allocated 
among diminished production quantities.  Personnel reductions have not kept pace with 
workload reductions [GAO 1998, NSIAD-99-31, p. 56]. 
The Army has followed a “shrink in place” approach to reducing production to 
meet the needs expressed in the National Military Strategy [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998].  
The Army has lacked time and resources to modernize or otherwise invest in more 
flexible, or in right-sized production lines, resulting in an increasing disparity between its 
production base and requirements for its capacity.  Some equipment operates only at a 
designed production rate, and reducing this rate is not feasible. 
Downsizing has shrunk management in place along with physical infrastructure 
[Doherty and Rhoads, 1998].  As a consequence, the organization, current processes, 
missions and functions are not well aligned and coordinated with current needs.  Current 
management is compartmentalized, and this frustrates integration and coordination. 
Budgets have not kept pace with large facility and maintenance costs, continued 
liabilities for environmental remediation within the United States and partnerships with 
other countries, and un-funded pension costs.  With the ratio of fixed to variable costs 
2 
becoming more and more unfavorable, it is clear that the Army’s production base 
requires reconfiguration to improve cost effectiveness to remain economically viable. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) defines ammunition replenishment capacity 
as the production capability to bring munitions stockpiles back to a pre-set level within a 
defined time interval after they have been depleted by a major military action [Systems 
Readiness Office, 1997].  Replenishment capacity requires production capacity in 
addition to that meeting everyday demands of the military for training and other 
purposes.  The Army keeps reserve production capacity in the form of inactive industrial 
facilities and lay-away industrial facilities, and these are costly.  Long lead times for 
bringing laid-away capacity back into production for replenishment is a significant 
concern [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998]. 
Utilities at ammunition plants are designed to support production at many times 
current volumes, and minimum feasible operating output from these utilities can be 
significantly greater than what the plants can consume.  This wastes output.  Utilities use 
raw materials (e.g., coal) at a level higher than necessary to maintain production and with 
higher labor cost [Systems Readiness Office, 1997]. 
Process equipment operating at its designed rate may produce faster than the plant 
needs.  Most plants resort to shut-down and start-up cycles of such equipment.  Such 
interruptions are hard on equipment, increase maintenance costs, and lead to poor 
production yields. 
When customers buy from the Army production base, they pay a unit-price that 
includes a share of the operating cost (cost of production), and also the full cost of 
maintaining underutilized capacity [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998]. 
“An arsenal official estimated that as of April 1998 Watervliet 
facility was using about 17 percent of its total manufacturing capacity—
based on a single 8-hour shift, 5-day workweek—compared with about 46 
percent 5 years ago and about 100 percent 10 years ago.  Similarly, as of 
July 1998, officials at the Rock Island Arsenal estimated that the facility 
was utilizing about 24 percent of its total manufacturing capacity 
compared with about 70 percent 5 years ago and about 81 percent 10 years 
ago. [GAO/NSIAD-99-31, p. 57]”  
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Likewise, according to a survey made for some of the AAPs by Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL), as of 1998 the annual costs of underutilized capacity are 
shown in Table 1. 
 
FACILITY CAPACITY UTILIZATION (%) 
ANNUAL COST OF 
UNDERUTILIZED 
CAPACITY ($M) 
Crane AAP 15-20 4.9 
Holston AAP 20-25 26.4 
Iowa AAP 30-35 15.5 
Kansas AAP 10-15 6.9 
Lake City AAP 10-15 37 
Lone Star AAP 1.5 20.1 
McAlester AAP 30-35 6.5 
Milan AAP 15-20 25.1 
Pine Bluff Arsenal 15-20 13.5 
Radford AAP 10-15 27 
TOTAL Avg. 15-20 182.9 
Table 1.   Capacity Utilization of Army Ammunition Plants 
The table depicts the costs of underutilized capacity for some of the Army Ammunition 
Plants as of 1998.  AAPs are not working at a full capacity, e.g., Crane AAP is only 
utilizing at most one fifth of its capacity and the annual cost of that underutilized capacity 
is $ 4.9 million. [From: Doherty and Rhoads, 1998] 
 
The Army production base can meet current requirements, but at what cost?  
Development of advanced, flexible munitions manufacturing technology for the Army 
production base is not an anticipated fully budgeted investment for the government.  The 
existing base is becoming obsolete, and is not cheap.  The risk of not being able to meet 
replenishment requirements is increasing.  Traditionally, such risks have been dealt with 
by directing workload to government-owned production facilities.  This is no longer 
viable because the munitions market has been split, with an increasing portion of the 
basic munitions work being done by commercial suppliers via Program Manager (PM) 
managed acquisition programs [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998]. 
So, the problem at hand is to reconfigure Army facilities, stabilize production 





C. IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE ISSUES AT HAND 
“The military services have over 5 million tons of conventional 
ammunition, explosives, and missiles valued at about $80 billion as of 
September 30, 1994.  This ammunition, if loaded onto railroad cars, would 
stretch over 800 miles—the distance from Washington, D.C., to Orlando, 
Florida. [GAO/NSIAD-96-129, p. 2]” 
Ammunition is critical to the military, and it has unique classes of commodity 
groups that are hazardous to manufacture.  The structure of the ammunition industrial 
base is also unique.  It is a combination of Government Owned Government Operated 
(GOGO) plants; Government Owned Contractor Operated (GOCO) plants; and 
Contractor Owned Contractor Operated (COCO) plants.  Ammunition production also 
requires some unique raw materials:  There are very few sources for the critical energetic 
materials and components necessary for production of high-quality ammunition 
[Whitfield II, 1993]. 
The vision of the Army Chief of Staff for a flexible, light, responsive force and 
the need to fund this has put increasing pressure on all commands, including the Army 
Materiel Command (AMC) to reduce its operating costs.  The Army cannot afford the 
full operational capability of the AAPs and arsenals, with tremendous amounts of 
underutilized capacity.  Retention costs of inactive plants could be eliminated if the Army 
determines that these plants are unneeded and declares them excess [GAO/NSIAD-97-
56].  “The assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management at the 13 January 2001 
Senior Installation Leaders’ Conference made it clear that the Army must think again 
about how its installations are funded and operated.  He considers it unlikely that the 
Army’s future budgets will provide the level of investment required to maintain the 
Army’s real estate in its current condition, let alone (outside a few specific programs) 
provide the investment funds required to improve the conditions of its installations.” 
[PwC, 2001b] 
The Congress, Department of Defense, and the Army need to answer the 
following questions: 
• What manufacturing technology will be needed to meet current and future 
ammunition requirements, which skills need to be retained, and how much of 
the production capacity should be kept? 
5 
• Does the current Army and commercial industrial base meet the requirements?  
How well? 
• Is it reasonable for the government to continue to own industrial facilities? 
• What is the best way to meet requirements and find capacity when it is 
needed? 
• What is the best way for the government to manage industrial base and 
ammunition production?  
The Department of Defense has directed the Army to prepare a report on the 
“rightsizing” of the industrial facilities and to determine how they can be consolidated to 
reduce the unutilized capacity.  In Program Budget Decision (PBD) 407 for Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2000, the Department of Defense expresses particular concern about the cost 
efficiency of the arsenal system [Albright, 2000].  This document states: 
“It is obvious from the data that the long-term financial stability of 
the Ordnance activities is in jeopardy.  The mobilization requirements are 
determined by the National Defense Strategy.  Notwithstanding the need 
to support wartime requirements, it must be recognized that having this 
much capacity idle year after year is very costly….Accordingly, the 
alternative provides for the Army to lead a study, with participation from 
the OSD Comptroller, PA&E, AT&L, and the Joint Staff, to look at the 
proper sizing of the ordnance activities.  The study recommendations 
should address the rightsizing of all the ordnance activities until unutilized 
capacity at any one facility is no higher than 25%. [Albright, 2000]” 
 
D. RELATED ARMY STUDIES OF THE PROBLEM 
The Army has commissioned several analyses of these issues. 
1. AMMO FAST 21 [Whitfield II, 1993] 
U.S. Army Armament Munitions and Chemical Command (AMCCOM) has 
proposed a strategy to reshape the munitions industrial base.  This strategy’s main goal is 
to minimize the operating costs of the arsenals and AAPs by reducing the total number of 
these facilities, declaring some excess, converting some to caretaker status, and 
encouraging the commercial use of those facilities and the equipment they have.  Some of 
these proposals were enabled by the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support 
Act that was approved by Congress in 1992 [10 U.S.C. 4553]. 
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2. Footprint Reduction 
The second phase of PBD 407 [RAND, 2002] requires the Army to assess the 
excess space and equipment at Watervliet and Rock Island Arsenal and to devise a 
footprint reduction plan.  The proper sizing of the arsenal’s buildings, equipment and 
tooling is to be determined by means of capacity analysis.  This capacity analysis is 
driven by requirements, including current needs, Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) for the next five years, and replenishment requirements that are now to replace 
one or two Major Theater Wars’ worth of consumed ammunition. 
3. Privatization-in-Place 
Privatization-in-place is a concept in which the functions or process centers of an 
installation that was once managed and operated by the government are taken over by a 
commercial sector.  To date, privatization-in-place has been used by DOD for 
transferring industrial work to the commercial sector, associated with base closures. 
“As a general rule, privatization-in-place has not optimized 
reductions in excess capacity and operating costs in the infrastructure 
owned and operated by DOD—a major base realignment and closure 
objective.  Rather than closing facilities and transferring defense work to 
other underutilized defense facilities in the public or private sector to 
reduce excess capacity, privatization-in-place allows work to remain at the 
original sites to be performed by the private sector. [GAO/NSIAD-00-23]” 
The infrastructure is no longer owned by DOD; however, it is still funded by 
DOD for contract work performed at those facilities.  As a result, although indirectly, the 
DOD continues to pay for unutilized capacity and the goal of eliminating excess capacity 
cannot be realized. 
4. Parcelization 
Parceling divides an installation (e.g., an ammunition plant) with excess area into 
smaller partitions and then conveys these parcels to third parties.  Operations Support 
Command (OSC) has endeavored to cut down the cost of retention of the excess facilities 
through renting out the facilities and land to third parties while executing the 
parcelization disposal process.  PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was commissioned by 
Operations Support Command to conduct a business case analysis that would include a 
cost-benefit analysis to quantify the financial impact of parceling excess Army real 
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property [PwC, 2001b].  The PwC study finds that parcelization is a poor method of 
disposing of a real property that increases the disposal time and the facility’s net 
operations, maintenance and disposal costs along with some other setbacks for the Army. 
5. Cost of Ownership Study 
Commissioned by the Operations Support Command, PwC conducted this data 
analysis study of ownership costs focusing on those costs required to maintain a facility 
in an inactive or lay-away status.  The study included arsenals, ammunition plants, and 
ammunition depots. [PwC, 2001a] 
6. The Totally Integrated Munitions Enterprise (TIME) Program 
[ARDEC, TACOM; 1997] 
Initiated in 1997, the objective of TIME was to update the Army’s munitions 
manufacturing capability.  “The high level vision of TIME is that it will provide the DOD 
with a cost-effective, flexible manufacturing capability to meet U.S. munitions needs in 
the 21st century.  This vision of TIME attempts to address munitions manufacturing as a 
total system, integrating all aspects of the enterprise, including the definition of munitions 
requirements, the design of products and processes, scale-up, production, supply chain, 
logistics, product support, and even the eventual demilitarization of unused munitions.” 
[National Research Council, 2002] 
TIME has supported the Army as the single manager for conventional 
ammunition for all of the armed services, to fulfill its responsibilities defined by DOD’s 
current and future munitions manufacturing and replenishment policy. 
 
E. CURRENT INDUSTRIAL BASE 
The Army Industrial base is a part of the National Technology and Industrial 
Base.  It is defined as a combination of GOGO, GOCO, and COCO industrial capacity 
available for development, manufacture, maintenance, modification, overhaul, storage, 
testing, and research of ammunition and ordnance items required by the United States and 
selected allies in support of the National Security Strategy (NSS), the Defense Planning 
Guidance (DPG), and the National Military Strategy.  Overall, the commercial and Army 
industrial base segments represent the National Technology and Industrial Base 
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infrastructure and are the source of all materiel needed by the Army to carry out its 
peacetime and replenishment responsibilities in support of the National Military Strategy.  
The Army industrial base infrastructure is a resource to satisfy the materiel needs of 
Army forces in a timely manner, with reliable, maintainable, and affordable materiel. 
Of the installations built after the Revolutionary War and during World Wars I 
and II to manufacture ammunition, 16 are still open today.  These 16 installations are 
categorized into five classes of production: 
• “Ordnance items, such as gun tubes and gun mounts are manufactured at 
GOGO Rock Island Arsenal, IL; and Watervliet Arsenal, NY; 
• Metal parts are manufactured at the GOCO Louisiana AAP, LA; Mississippi 
AAP, MS; Riverbank AAP, CA; and Scranton AAP, PA; 
• Load Assemble and Pack (LAP) operations of a special nature are conducted 
at the GOGO Crane Army Ammunition Activity, IN.; McAlester AAP, OK.; 
and Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR.; 
• Other GOCO LAP operations are conducted at Iowa AAP, IA; Kansas AAP, 
MO.; and Milan, Lake City, Lone Star, Louisiana AAPs also manufacture 
metal parts and conduct LAP operations; and 
• Propellants and explosives are manufactured at the GOCO Radford AAP, 
VA.; and Holston AAP, TN.” [Tarantino, 2001] 
In summary, of the 16 facilities under review (See Table 2), two are GOGO “hard 
iron” arsenals that manufacture ordnance items, three are GOGO AAPs, and 11 are 
GOCO AAPs. 
In addition to the installations named, 11 other ammunition plants have been 
declared excess, 10 outside of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, and 













Watervliet Arsenal Cannon Mfg. Active GOGO 1.2M 91 
Rock Island Arsenal Manufacturing Active GOGO 6.5M 197 
Iowa AAP LAP Active GOCO 4.3M 1148 
Lake City AAP LAP Active GOCO 3.2M 490 
Louisiana Metal Parts Inactive GOCO 2.8M 731 
Mississippi AAP Metal Parts Inactive GOCO 229K 131 
Lone Star AAP LAP Active GOCO 2.2M 858 
McAlester AAP Bomb Fill Active GOGO 9.5M 2226 
Crane AAP LAP/Bomb Fill Active GOGO 5.6M 209 
Pine Bluff Arsenal LAP/Chemical Active GOGO 3.5M 947 
Holston AAP RDX/HMX, Explos. Active GOCO 2.5M 475 
Milan AAP LAP Active GOCO 3.9M 1457 
Radford AAP Propellant Mfg. Active GOCO 3.7M 1038 
Riverbank AAP Metal Parts Inactive GOCO 800K 184 
Scranton AAP Metal Parts Inactive GOCO 500K 4 
Kansas AAP LAP Inactive GOCO 2.2M 555 
Table 2.   Basic Facts About the Arsenals and Army Ammunition Plants Studied by this 
Thesis 
Arsenals and AAPs with different missions and management modes range in size from 
McAlester AAP with 2,226 buildings in 9.5 million square feet of development, to 
Scranton AAP with only four buildings in 500 thousand square feet. [From: PwC, 2001a] 
 
The Armament Retooling and Manufacturing Support (ARMS) Act of 1992 [10 
U.S.C. 4553], authorizes a program under which funds are appropriated to permit 
infrastructure investments to attract commercial tenants.  If the Army elects to 
consolidate its ammunition production base, required capabilities and capacities can be 
moved onto a smaller number of installations rendering others excess.  The need for a 
process center that today happens to be located in a structure housed by an installation 
should not be confused with the need for the structure or installation itself.  Process 
centers can be moved, and as a consequence installations and structures can be rendered 
excess, and eventually disposed.  For that reason, it seems appropriate initially to 
determine the optimal assignment of capabilities and capacities to installations before 
changing the ARMS program’s improvements and encumbering installations with long-
term contracts and tenants. 
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The commercial sector cannot currently provide all the capabilities and capacity 
needed to meet peacetime and replenishment requirements for ammunition production 
[Doherty and Rhoads, 1998].  Capabilities in the government-owned base are needed to 
meet these requirements.  This is primarily due to the way ammunition production has 
been managed by the government.  The government has chosen to retain ownership of 
installations with capabilities to manufacture propellants and explosives, to load, 
assemble and pack (LAP) large caliber ammunition and bombs, pyrotechnics, large 
quantities of small caliber ammunition, and to manufacture large quantities of specialized 
metal parts (See Figure 2) [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998].  Work is directed to these 
government installations so that the skills can be maintained and as much of the base as 




Figure 2.   Ammunition Metal Parts Manufacturing 
Ammunition metal parts manufacturing can be categorized into artillery shell 
manufacturing, deep-drawn cartridge case manufacturing, and grenade manufacturing.  
Artillery shell and deep-drawn cartridge case manufacturing require special capability 
and equipment. [From: Tarantino, 2002b] 
 
F. REQUIREMENTS  
The Army is DOD’s single manager for the military services’ conventional 
ammunition and is responsible for ensuring that an adequate industrial base is maintained 
to meet the services’ ammunition requirements [GAO/NSIAD-96-133].  The industrial 
base must have the capability and capacity for the manufacture of a wide range of 
ammunition and ordnance items.  Ordnance materiel is needed for two basic reasons.  In 
peacetime, the base must develop new rounds for testing; and manufacture special 
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training rounds; and existing rounds or components for war reserves, stockpile 
maintenance or upgrades.  Current policy assumes MTWs are fought and won without 
relying on expansion of the industrial base; no surge is assumed [Tarantino, 2001].  
Further, ammunition and ordnance items are needed to replenish stocks consumed during 
major MTWs.  Current policy requires capacity to be maintained to manufacture one 
MTW’s worth of replenishment materiel generally within three years after the completion 
of a two MTW scenario [Tarantino, 2001].  After an MTW, the base must be able to 
rapidly replenish inventories depleted during the conflict.  The peacetime and 
replenishment requirements therefore provide the design basis for the production base 
that must be available to comply with the Defense Planning Guidance [Doherty and 
Rhoads, 1998]. 
1. Peacetime Requirements 
Peacetime requirements represent the services’ planned procurement of 
conventional ammunition (and Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition [SMCM] 
related components) under the current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP 96-03) 
[Doherty and Rhoads, 1998].  The procurement is aimed to satisfy Future Year Defense 
Plan training, testing and current operation requirements—on top of stockpiling the war 
reserves in anticipation of a two MTW scenario, while complying with federal budgetary 
constraints. 
Officially declared in 1995, and still undergoing revision, the DOD’s Capabilities-
Based Munitions Requirements (CBMR) determines requirements.  The basis for this is 
to give general guidance for all the branches of service to determine the total munitions 
requirements (TMR).  Not constrained by the budget, the Total Munitions Requirements 
is broken down into two categories.  These categories are war reserve munitions and 
training, testing, and current operational requirements. 
The war reserve munitions can be separated into the following four categories:  
combat requirements, residual readiness requirements, strategic readiness requirements, 
and special operations forces requirements.  The combat requirements are those 
ammunitions required to defeat the threat and maintain operational flexibility during two 
MTWs. 
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The Army defines “operational flexibility” as the munitions required to support 
the initial readiness of combat troops committed to the MTWs, plus the munitions in the 
“sustainability pipeline” [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998].  A combat load is the mix and 
number of munitions a weapon platform or system would be required to carry into 
combat.  Initial readiness states that all weapon platforms or systems are issued with one 
combat load of munitions at the very beginning of the MTW.  The sustainability pipeline 
is composed of those munitions staged intra-theater to sustain the initial war fight until 
the inter-theater (strategic) logistics takes its place. 
The readiness reserve requirements and strategic reserve requirements are the 
munitions required after the completion of the MTW.  For those Army forces committed 
to the MTW, the residual readiness requirement is generally one combat load, and is 
required to enable the Army to take care of any unforeseen contingencies to sustain 
operational flexibility.  The strategic readiness requirement pertains to uncommitted 
forces and is currently fixed at one combat load [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998]. 
Training munitions can be categorized into training-standard and training-unique 
munitions.  The maximum training requirements are determined from the prescribed 
(mandatory) training standards for individual and weapons systems and from the 
programs of instruction requirements for the training base [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998]. 
The requirement for annual training is calculated from historical records of actual 
training expenditures.  The highest execution within the last three years is adjusted to 
accommodate force structure changes, weapons fielding plans, and changes in training 
strategies [Doherty and Rhoads, 1998]. 
Testing munitions can be classified as research, development, and test and 
evaluation (RDTE) and life-cycle maintenance and upgrade munitions.  The total 






2. Replenishment Requirements 
Replenishment requirements represent the munitions and components that need to 
be rapidly replenished after the two MTWs have occurred-in anticipation of a third MTW 
[Doherty and Rhoads, 1998].  The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review states: 
"The United States will continue to meet its commitments around 
the world, including in Southwest and Northeast Asia, by maintaining the 
ability to defeat aggression in two critical areas in overlapping time 
frames.  The United States is not abandoning planning for two conflicts to 
plan for fewer than two.  On the contrary, DOD is changing the concept all 
together by planning for victory across the spectrum of possible conflict. 
…U.S. forces will remain capable of swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. 
allies and friends in any two theaters of operation in overlapping 
timeframes. … U.S. forces will be capable of decisively defeating an 
adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S. forces are conducting 
major combat operations. [QDR, 2001]" 
From this, we conclude that planning for munitions production must ensure 
adequate reserves for at least one major theater war, with provision for timely production 
of replacement munitions concurrent with their expenditure in that war and/or adequate 
reserves for a second major theater war. 
The process for determining the replenishment requirements is implemented in 
five basic steps.  First, the DPG provides the principal planning assumptions on the 
scope, duration, and intensity of anticipated MTWs and the general objectives for 
industrial base to support the Army prior to and after wars.  The second step is to estimate 
how many of what items, such as tanks, mortars and artillery pieces, are destroyed and 
how many spare parts and how much of what kind of ammunition will possibly be 
consumed or required during an MTW.  Step three determines how to restore the Army.  
The fourth step is to choose where this materiel will be manufactured, i.e. commercial 
firms (whether COCO or GOCO), government factories.  Finally, the decision is made as 






G. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 
Changing the governance of the industrial base is a possible approach of great 
significance to improving the manufacture of ammunition and ordnance items and 








































































Figure 3.   Options to Reconfigure the Ammunition Industrial Base  
Reconfiguration of the current ammunition industrial base is challenged by some factors 
such as national security and cost.  Depending on these factors, the status quo of an 
installation can be changed by any of the four options–consolidating, recapitalizing and 
unifying, creating a Federal Government Corporation (FGC), privatizing or a mix of 
them. [From: RAND, 2002] 
 




Privatizing simply means divesting an installation of the means of manufacture 
and procuring all the necessary ammunition and ordnance items from commercial sector.  
With that option the Army gets rid of what some refer to as a peripheral function, 
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manufacturing.  However, this option minimizes the Army’s control over the land, 
buildings, and equipment and manufacture, as well as introduces cost risk, which is a 
concern to the Army. 
2. Create an FGC 
This option requires transferring of all the manufacturing assets from the Army to 
a congressionally chartered Federal Government Corporation (FGC).  Creating an FGC is 
compatible with the view that the government must retain control of ordnance facilities 
and manufacturing of the required materiel while leaving the management of 
manufacturing to an organization whose main function is manufacturing. 
3. Consolidate 
Consolidating attempts to relocate functions to as few of the current properties as 
possible.  Once this option is implemented, excess facilities are returned to the public and 
private institutions for other uses.  The implementation phase of this option would incur 
some costs for the transfers of functions from one installation to another. 
4. Recapitalize and Unify 
With recapitalization manufacturing moves from today’s single-function 
ammunition installations to installations that serve other purposes as well. 
 
H. SCOPE OF THIS THESIS 
The objective of this thesis is to develop a flexible decision support tool that can 
suggest the way and the rate that actions should be carried out to transition government 
ammunition facilities between modes of operation while satisfying complicated long-
term constraints on resources and oversight.  This decision support tool will minimize 
fixed and variable possession and operating costs of Army arsenals and Army 
Ammunition Plants (AAPs), meeting the replenishment requirements and the demand for 
peacetime production of ammunition and ordnance items. 
16 
Decisions to maintain, close, or change the management of government-owned 
and operated (GOGO) facilities, government-owned, contractor operated (GOCO) 
facilities, and completely privatized facilities (COCO) are governed by a number of 
economic and political constraints.  Base closing and realignment incurs significant 
relocation costs for both equipment and personnel, and property and equipment transfers 
are costly and time consuming.  Other factors bear on these decisions, including the sheer 
complexity and number of actions that the Army can manage at any one time, the cost of 
actions, including environmental remediation, and the degree of control the Army wants 
to exercise over the resulting ammunition infrastructure. 
The work reported in this thesis derives from a tasking that the Deputy Under 
Secretary of Army for Operations Research gave the Center for Army Analysis to review 
ongoing study (PBD407 study) that examines the reorganization of the Army’s 
ammunition production base.  As part of CAA’s review, they recommended to the lead of 
PBD407, the Director of Force Development (Logistics), that this work be accomplished.  
CAA is also tasked with the G3’s Stationing of the Army for Transformation analysis, 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND CURRENT REGULATIONS 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Army is not foreign to the idea of using optimization to reduce and reshape its 
infrastructure.  Prior studies share the common goal of reducing the infrastructure cost 
and minimizing the unutilized capacity of a variety of Army Installations.  However, 
none of these studies has directly addressed the ammunition industrial base requirements 
while minimizing the unutilized capacity at the arsenals and AAPs. 
1. Base Realignment and Closure Action Scheduler (BRACAS) [Wong, 
1995] 
Rather than just calculating cost estimates for the alternatives at hand, Free [1994] 
developed a BRAC optimization model as a scheduler for the Army base realignment and 
closure actions.  Following that, and as an improvement to the Cost of Base Realignment 
Actions (COBRA) [Richardson and Kirmse, 1994] and Free’s model, a mixed-integer 
linear program BRACAS was developed.  BRACAS suggests timetables for BRAC 
actions that both satisfy yearly budget constraints and maximize net present value. [Dell, 
1998] 
BRACAS determines when to allocate the necessary one-time costs of installation 
closure and realignment actions to obtain the maximum net present value of the savings 
less the one-time costs while satisfying yearly budgets. [Wong, 1995] 
2. Modeling Closure of Army Materiel Command (AMC) Installations 
[Tarantino, 1992] 
Tarantino developed a bi-criteria mixed integer programming model with the 
objectives of minimizing infrastructure and operating costs and maximizing military 
value to generate alternate realignment solutions for AMC.  The model considers 
realignment of depot maintenance, research and development, test and evaluation, and 
administrative functions on 32 different AMC installations. 
3. Optimally Stationing Units to Bases (OSUB) [Dell, Fletcher, Parry, 
and Rosenthal; 1994] 
OSUB was developed to help the Army with its 1995 BRAC decisions for 
maneuver and training bases.  It is a bi-criterion integer linear programming model that 
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generates solutions such as realignment and closure recommendations for Army 
maneuver and training bases by minimizing operating cost while maximizing military 
value. 
4. The Regionalization and Outsourcing Optimization Model (ROOM) 
[Kerman, Brown, and Dell; 1998] 
ROOM reduces planned infrastructure costs using a personnel assignment model 
subject to some additional constraints.  It suggests an optimal combination of 
regionalization and outsourcing for a Navy shore installation with personnel numbers 
altered by homebasing. 
5. Optimal Stationing of Army Forces (OSAF) [CAA-R-01-42, 2001] 
The objective of OSAF is to systematically examine possible alternatives for 
Army stationing and determine an optimal Army stationing policy for a given set of 
installations, force structure, available budget, and stationing restrictions.  The 
installation types OSAF addresses in the continental United States are maneuver, 
command and control, professional schools, major training areas, and training schools 
along with a number of leased facilities.  
 
B. REGULATIONS 
Reconfiguration of Army ammunition industrial base is restricted by different 
regulations.  These regulations basically specify the rules of reconfiguring the industrial 
base. 
1. ARMS Act [10 U.S.C. 4553] 
Created by Public Law 102-484, the Armament Retooling and Manufacturing 
Support (ARMS) Act of 1992, authorizes a program under which funds are appropriated 
to permit infrastructure investments to attract commercial tenants.  
2. Arsenal Act [10 U.S.C. 4532] 
In 1920, Congress enacted the Arsenal Act, which provides that the Army is to 
have its supplies made in U.S. factories or arsenals on condition that they can do so on an 
economical basis.  In its current version, this Act states: 
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“The Secretary of the Army shall have supplies needed for the 
Department of the Army made in factories or arsenals owned by the 
United States, so far as those factories or arsenals can make those supplies 
on an economical basis.  The Secretary may abolish any United States 
arsenal that he considers unnecessary. [Albright, 2000]” 
When making decisions based on the Arsenal Act, the Army compares public and 
private sector manufacturing costs to determine whether supplies can be economically 
obtained from government owned facilities---a process referred to as “make or buy”. 
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
There are many economic and political constraints that restrict the decisions to 
maintain, close, or change the management of GOGO, GOCO, and COCO facilities.  
Base realignment and closure operations incur significant relocation costs for both 
equipment and personnel, and property and equipment transfers are costly and time 
consuming.  These decisions are influenced by other factors, including the complexity 
and number of actions that the Army can handle at any one time, the cost of actions 
including environmental remediation, and the degree of control the Army wants to 
exercise over the resulting ammunition infrastructure. 
The model introduced here is an aggregated, optimization-based decision support 
tool that will suggest optimal schedules of actions that satisfy exogenous constraints on 
money, management, and capacity over the long term. 
The model considers reconfiguration of 16 different installations, of which, two 
are GOGO “hard iron” arsenals that manufacture ordnance items, three are GOGO AAPs, 
and 11 GOCO AAPs. Of the AAPs that are in GOCO mode of operation, five are in 
inactive status.  The rest of these installations are in active status. 
The model suggests year-by-year operating modes for each installation, structure 
and process center.  A schedule of which installations, structures or process centers are 
running (in any mode of operation), which ones are disposed, and which process centers 
will be moved to which receiving structures and installations is specified for every year 
for a 10-year planning horizon.  The model ensures that the replenishment requirements 
and the demand for peacetime production of ammunition and ordnance items are met and 
some additional constraints are satisfied. 
For every year, we determine which open and working process center will have to 
work how many shifts to accomplish its part of the manufacturing of required materiel. 
The model will also determine the costs incurred to perform the operations stated 
above.  Those costs include: 
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• The fixed cost to operate an installation, structure, and process center; 
• The multi-year costs of any mode transition for each installation, structure and 
process center; 
• The variable cost of operating a process center; and 
• The cost of moving process centers between installations and structures. 
1. Model Objective 
The objective function of the model evaluates the fixed and variable possession 
and operating costs of Army arsenals and Army Ammunition Plants (AAPs), the cost of 
changing modes of operation for each installation, structure and process center, and the 
cost of moving process centers between installations or structures. 
2. Modeling Assumptions 
Each installation considered by the model has structures that house process 
centers of certain types, such as LAP, metal parts manufacturing, canon manufacturing, 
and explosives manufacturing.  These installations, the structures inside them and the 
process centers housed in those structures are allowed to change modes of operation over 
time, in our case a 10-year planning horizon (See Figure 4).  We only allow change of 
operating modes where admissible.  For instance, if an installation is in an active GOGO 
state the alternate new modes of operation for that installation for the next year would be 
active GOGO, active GOCO, active COCO, active FGC, inactive GOGO, and finally the 
state of being disposed.  Likewise, all of the other admissible transitions are specified 
one-by-one by the model.  Further, because of the current regulations and restrictive 
legislation, or because the Army might want to limit the degree of changes permitted, for 

























Y01 Y04 Y05     …    Y10  
DISPOSEDDISPOSED
Figure 4.   Change of Management Modes of Installations, Structures, and/or Process 
Centers over Time 
This figure represents the alternate change of modes over time for any installation, 
structure or process center.  Because decisions in years “y01” through “y03” are already 
committed, the first set of discretionary solutions appears in year “y04”. 
 
The model is an aggregate one, that is, we do not consider the operation or 
movement of machines individually.  Rather, the finest resolution we consider in the 
model is the process center (See Figure 5). 
 















Figure 5.   Moving  Process Centers 
The figure is a representation of potential movement of process centers from a losing 
structure (in Installation 1) to a gaining structure (in Installation 2). Gaining structures 
can be either in the same or in another installation. 
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By using elastic constraints [Brown, et. al., 1997] we permit yearly peacetime 
requirements and yearly and/or cumulative replenishment requirements to be violated at a 
penalty cost for each ton of violation.  This permits us to deal with grossly infeasible 
scenarios, a real concern. 
The model represents the year of action, rather than the year that the action is 
adopted.  If there is a lag between decision and action, that lag is exogenous.  Here, we 
use the first three years as “frozen”, so this lag is implicitly taken to be three years. 
The various costs of implementing a particular decision starting in a particular 
year may be incurred by the Army over the entire planning horizon, rather than all at 
once. 
The space a process center needs when it is in inactive status is assumed to be 
negligible compared to the space required for it when it is in active status. 
 
B. MODEL FORMULATION 
1. Indices 
i I∈   Installation (fenced dirt) ~16 
            Structure (shelter or shelter complex) , 's s S∈
 i(s)  Host installation for structure  s S∈
 p P∈   Process center  
                                   (Hardware, e.g. {small metal fab., LAP, energetics,…})   
sp   Subset of structures  that can house process center p s S∈
t T∈   Process type {e.g., small metal fab., LAP, energetics,…} 
t(p)  Process type of process center p P∈  
            Calendar year =0,1,…,Y~10 y Y+ +∈
lag  Years from decision to execution ~3 
# #y Y∈  Frozen years {0,1,…,lag} 
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, 'y y Y∈  Planning years = {lag+1, lag+2,…, Y}, Y Y  #Y+= −
m M+ +∈  Mode of operation  
                    {ACTIVEGOGO, ACTIVEGOCO, ACTIVECOCO, ACTIVEFGC, 
                      INACTIVEGOGO, INACTIVEGOCO, INACTIVECOCO, 
                      INACTIVEFGC, disposed} 
, 'm m M∈  Modes of operation when entity is “kept”, \{ }M M disposed+=  
* *m M∈  “Open-and-working” modes of operation 
                 {ACTIVEGOGO, ACTIVEGOCO, ACTIVECOCO, ACTIVEFGC} 
# #m M∈  “Closed” modes of operation 
    {INACTIVEGOGO, INACTIVEGOCO, INACTIVECOCO, INACTIVEFGC} 
{ , }m m MM+ ∈ Set of admissible transitions, from m , to  M∈ m M+ +∈
{ *, }m m MSM+ ∈ Set of admissible transitions from open  to  * *m M∈ m M+ +∈
#{ , }m m MCM+ ∈ Set of admissible transitions from closed  to  # #m M∈ m M+ +∈
 
2. Given Data 
,t yreplencap  Replenishment capacity required in year y for process type t (tons) 
,2 t ywork train  Demand in year y for training rounds from process type t (tons) 
,p yshiftyield  Tons produced per shift by process center p (tons/shift) 
, , *p y mworkmax  Maximum work capacity of process center p in year y working in  
                        mode m* (shifts) 
, , *p y mworkmin  Minimum work capacity of process center p in year y working in 
                        mode m* (shifts) 
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sstructspace  Space capacity of structure s (space) 
pprocspace  Space requirement of process center p (space) 
, , , ,i y m m y
icost + '  Fixed cost(s) to keep installation i during year y in mode m, 
                        and transition to mode m+ the next year, incurred in ($) y′
, , , , 's y m m y
scost +  Fixed cost(s) to keep structure s during year y in mode m,  
                        and transition to mode m+ the next year, incurred in  ($) y′
, , , ,p y m m y
pcost + '  Fixed cost(s) to keep process center p during year y in mode m, 
                        and transition to mode m+ the next year, incurred in  ($) y′
, , , ',p y s s ymcost '  Fixed cost(s) to move process center p during year y from structure 
                        s in installation i(s) to structure  in installation i( ), incurred in  
    ($) 
s′ s′
y′
*p,y,mpvcost  Variable cost of working process center p during year y in mode 
                       m*  ($/shift) 
 
3. Decision Variables 
, , ,i y m m
OPERATE + +  in year y, keep installation i in mode m, and transition to mode  
                              m+ the next year (binary) 
, , ,s y m m
HOUSE + +
+
      In year y, keep structure s in mode m, and transition to mode 
                               m+ the next year (binary) 
, , ,p y m m
KEEP +         In year y, keep process center p in mode m, and transition to 
                               mode m+ the next year (binary) 
, ,p y sRUN         Process center p housed in structure s in year y, and both are  
          open-and-working (binary) 
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, , ,p y s s
MOVE + '         In year y, move process center p from structure s to s‘ (binary) 
, , *p y mWORK        Operation of process center p in open-and-working mode m* 
                              during year y (shifts) 
 
4. Formulation 
 Minimize fixed and variable possession and operating costs 
Min                                                         
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s.t.   
By end of each year, fill cumulative training demand 
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By end of each year, maintain cumulative replenishment capacity 
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During each year, maintain yearly replenishment capacity 
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Respect open-and-working process center work capacities 
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Each kept process center p must be located in a kept host structure 
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Process center p and its host structure s are open-and-working 
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Process centers located in a structure must fit in the structure 
, , , , ,
| { , }p
p p y s s s y m m
p P s s m m MM
procspace RUN strucspace HOUSE +
+∈ = ∈
≤∑ ∑                (10) 
                                                                                              ,s S y Y∀ ∈ ∈
Each open-and-working process center p must be located in an open-and-working 
host structure s, maybe in a different mode 
, ,, , *,
{ *, } p
p y sp y m m
s sm m MSM
KEEP RUN+
+ ∈∈
≤∑ ∑    ,p P y Y∀ ∈ ∈   (11) 
Each open-and-working structure must have an open-and-working host 
installation, maybe in a different mode 
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Year-to-year mode transitions for each installation 
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Each process center 
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Moving process centers 
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Selection constraints to tighten continuous relaxation of model 
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Initial conditions, frozen for lag years  
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, , * 0p y mWORK ≥     , , * *p P y Y m M∀ ∈ ∈ ∈  
, , {0,1}p y sRUN ∈     , ,p P y Y s S∀ ∈ ∈ ∈  
 
5. Discussion 
The objective function evaluates fixed and variable possession and operation costs 
of installations, structures and process centers, along with the cost of changing the modes 
of operation for each of those entities year-by-year and the costs incurred by moving 
process centers between structures. 
Constraints (1) through (3) maintain adequate capacity to meet cumulative 
training demand and yearly and cumulative replenishment requirements.  These 
constraints contain elastic variables (implied by the distinctive inequality symbols ≥ , but 
not shown explicitly) that permit each cumulative and/or annual constraint to be violated 
at a penalty cost for each ton of violation. 
o
Constraints (4) and (5) restrict the operation of process centers to be bounded by 
minimum and maximum work capacities. 
Constraints (6) ensure that each kept process center is located in a kept host 
structure. 
Constraints (7) through (9) enforce that if process center p is open and working, 
then its host structure s is open and working. 
Constraints (10) enforce space restrictions on the process centers, which state that 
the process centers located in a structure must fit in that structure.  If it is assumed that 
the process centers take the same amount of space when they are in inactive status, the 
term  can be replaced with the term '  in this constraint. , ,p y sRUN , , ,p y s sMOVE
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Constraints (11) put a restriction on each open and working process center forcing 
each of them to be located in an open and working host structure. 
Constraints (12) apply the same restrictions on open and working structures 
forcing each to be located in an open and working host installation.  Both constraints (11) 
and (12) permit process centers located in structures and structures located in an 
installation and the installation itself to operate in different modes. 
Similarly, constraints (13) enforce that each closed, but kept structure s must have 
a kept host installation, albeit perhaps in a different mode. 
Constraints (14) through (17) represent year-to-year mode transitions for each 
installation, each structure and each process center, and the movements of process 
centers. 
Constraints (18) through (21) are selection constraints to tighten the continuous 
relaxation of model by ensuring that once an entity is disposed it is gone forever and 
cannot be regained. 
Constraints (22) through (25) represent the initial conditions for the entities. 
For each installation, structure and process center we permit more than one mode 
change over the planning horizon.  The number of mode transitions can easily be 
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Similarly the number of relocations of each process center can be controlled.  
E.g.: 
, , , '
, , '
1p y s s
y s s s
MOVE
≠
≤∑     p P∀ ∈   (TM) 
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There is a possibility that some installations, structures and/or process centers 
may get disposed after year ‘y10’.  This is due to “end effects”, that is there is no demand 
after year ‘y10’ and disposing is the cheapest alternative.  This minor issue can easily be 
dealt with by precluding the variables “OPERAT ”, “,' 10 ', ,' 'i y m disposedE ,' 10', ,' 's y m disposedHOUSE ”, 
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IV. RATIONALE FOR THIS MODEL 
We plan by year because the DOD and the Army also plan by year.  We consider 
a 10-year planning horizon because the cost implications at near-term decisions extend at 
least that far into the future. 
As a part of National Technology and Industrial Base, the Army industrial base is 
defined as a combination of GOGO, GOCO, and COCO industrial capacities.  Those are 
the management modes of the facilities currently supporting the ammunition industrial 
base.  Some of those facilities are in active and some are in inactive modes of operation.  
Other than these management modes, the new idea of creating an FGC has been proposed 
to DOD and Army officials.  This new option requires transferring of all the manufacture 
assets by the Army to a congressionally chartered FGC.  This new management mode 
permits an installation or its structures or process centers to be active or inactive.  The 
model modes of operation reflect these alternatives. 
Since the enactment of the ARMS Act, it has been admissable with the Congress 
and the Army to permit an installation in one mode of operation to contain structures or 
process centers in another mode of operation.  There have been examples of this 
implemented since 1992.  Based on this, the model permits structures in an installation 
and the process centers in each of those structures to operate in different modes.  For 
instance, an installation and the structures in it may be in GOGO operation mode, but a 
housed process center may be operated as an FGC or a GOCO.  This embellishment is 
easily restricted if it is not wanted. 
Once suggestions for a 10-year planning horizon are made, the budget allocated to 
the Army in a fiscal year may not be sufficient to pay for all the costs incurred for the 
implementation of the decisions suggested for that fiscal year.  The various costs of 
implementing a decision will be incurred by the Army over the planning horizon, rather 
than all at once.  We allocate costs incurred by a decision over the remaining years of the 
planning horizon.  Other approaches to distribute those costs would be easy to 
implement.  And, in particular, we can add constraints that are yearly aspiration levels for 
expenditures to adhere to forecast budgets. 
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We could use spreadsheets if we just needed a descriptive model, and were 
willing and able to input a complete, feasible decision for analysis.  However, we need a 
prescriptive model to suggest what actions to take, because we are trying to discover 
what to do. 
Solving this model manually is essentially impossible.  Single alternatives can be 
evaluated but there are billions of them.  Manual analysis of any alternative takes a long 
time. 
Decisions can be manually controlled.  The number of actions can be limited, the 
per-year cost can be constrained, the admissible transitions restructured, and so forth.  
The idea is to equip the Army with a planning tool that can optimize to a “clean sheet” 
plan, or investigate carefully crafted excursions from favored existing plans. 
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V. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
A. DATA 
Synthetic, unclassified, representative data has been generated randomly for a 
proof prototype using the General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) [GAMS, 2002] 
for a total of 16 different installations, 34 structures, 19 process centers, nine process 
types for a 10 year period. 
To avoid "too-random" costs that lead to "too-random" outcomes, we have built a 
simple cost model to generate synthetic, "systematic" rather than completely random 
costs.  We seek costs that mimic the size of installations and that do not vary too much 
over time, and that induce reasonable, face-valid transitions in our prototypic 
experiments. 
For each entity and mode, we specify a uniform base annual operating and 
possession cost. We use this seed cost as the active cost for all years, and we use 20 
percent of this for inactive cost in all years. 
For a transition from active to inactive, same management mode, we just add 10 
percent of operating and possession costs. For transition from inactive to active, same 
management mode, we add 60 percent of operating and possession costs. 
For transition from one management mode to another, we add 200 percent of the 
base cost of the losing mode. 
Other costs such as process center variable costs and movement costs, peacetime 
and replenishment requirements for each process type, and the amount of ammunition or 
ordnance items manufactured by each process center are generated in a similar way. 
The idea is to get costs with some rational pattern that can be seen, explained, and 
easily changed in case someone has some specific suggestions.  We want to keep this 
simple because random costs can be too distracting, and are more difficult to deal with 
than systematic costs. 
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 B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
The ammunition industrial base rationalization model is prototypically 
implemented in the GAMS [GAMS, 2002], using the CPLEX mixed integer program 
(MIP) solver [ILOG, 2002]. 
1. Full Model 
The full model has been run with all of the 16 installations, 34 structures, and 19 
process centers with nine different process types.  The synthetic data files created by our 
generator are imported into GAMS as tables by using the “include” function.  The 
resulting model has 41,282 variables, 33,495 of which are binary, and a total of 12,615 
constraints.  We use an integrality tolerance of one percent.  Using an IBM compatible 
personal computer with 1 Gigabyte of random access memory and a 2 Gigahertz Intel 
Pentium 4 processor, with the random data it can take between an hour to many hours to 
generate and solve the full model depending on how relaxed or tight the constraints 
become with the data created. 
2. Single-Issue Scenario 
The Army regards LAP process centers and the installations housing them as the 
facilities with the highest unutilized capacity.  LAP process centers are on the Army and 
DOD priority list for rationalization.  We have run the model for only LAP process 
centers, and the installations and structures housing them.  In this case we are left with 
only seven installations, 14 structures, and seven process centers and of course only one 
type of process: LAP. 
This example of focused analysis requires simply fixing each variable that does 
not relate to any kind of LAP operation to its current state.  The process centers that are 
already open and working are forced to stay open and working with a specified number 
of operating shifts (See Table 3).  It takes between 15 seconds to a few minutes to 
generate and solve this single-issue model depending on how relaxed or tight the 
constraints become with the data created.  The model is solved to optimality in the 
relaxed case, and with less than one percent relative integrality gap (to within less than 
one percent of integer optimality) in the tight case. 
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 Process C. Op. Mode y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10
CRNbombfil ACTGOGO 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
CRNLAP ACTFGC 1092
CRNLAP ACTGOGO 260 260 260
HOLSexplos ACTGOCO 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
IOWALAP ACTCOCO 260
IOWALAP ACTFGC 260 1092 1092
IOWALAP ACTGOCO 625
KANSLAP ACTFGC 260 260 1092
LAKECLAP ACTFGC 260
LAKECLAP ACTGOCO 260
LNSTLAP ACTFGC 1092 260 496
LNSTLAP ACTGOCO 260
McAbombfil ACTGOGO 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
MILLAP ACTFGC 369 1092 260
MILLAP ACTGOCO 260
PBLFchemic ACTGOGO 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
PBLFLAP ACTFGC 260 1092 1092
PBLFLAP ACTGOGO 260
RADFpropel ACTGOCO 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
RADFTNT ACTGOCO 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
RIAmanu ACTGOGO 260 260 260 260 260 260 260
WVLcanmanu ACTGOGO 260 260 260 260 260 260 260  
Table 3.   LAP Optimization Case: Process Centers Yearly Work Schedule 
In this single-issue scenario, each non-LAP process center is fixed to its current mode of 
operation and each active one is forced to work at least a minimum number of shifts in a 
year.  The model is solved for only LAP process centers.  For each process center that is 
specified by the model to stay in any active mode of operation, the number of shifts it has 
to work in a year is also specified.  For instance, LNSTLAP process center is scheduled 
by the model to work 260 shifts (minimum work capacity) in active GOCO mode of 
operation in year ‘y04’, 1092 shifts (maximum work capacity) in active FGC mode of 
operation in year ‘y05’.  Because it is in inactive mode of operation it is not scheduled to 
work for the next three years (‘y06’ through ‘y08’).  It is again scheduled to work 260 
and 496 shifts in active FGC mode of operation in years ‘y09’ and ‘y10’ respectively. 
 
Our model generates an output log with all the detailed year-by-year information 
about the suggested operation modes of installations, structures, and process centers (See 
Table 4).  In addition, all these results from GAMS are exported directly to Microsoft 
EXCEL [Microsoft Corp., 2000] files for numerical and graphical presentation.  There 
are 10 data sheets (the original data created) and 13 results sheets that are automatically 
populated with solution details.  E.g., installation history, installation cost, process center 
movement history, process center work, etc. 
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 Process C. y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10
CRNLAP ACTGOGO ACTFGC ACTGOGO ACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO
IOWALAP ACTGOCO ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTCOCO ACTFGC INACTFGC INACTFGC
KANSLAP INACTGOCO INACTFGC INACTFGC INACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC
LAKECLAP ACTGOCO ACTFGC INACTFGC INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO
LNSTLAP ACTGOCO ACTFGC INACTFGC INACTFGC INACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC
MILLAP ACTGOCO ACTFGC ACTFGC INACTFGC INACTFGC INACTFGC ACTFGC
PBLFLAP ACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC INACTFGC  
Table 4.   LAP Process Centers Management Modes Optimized over Time 
This table represents the management mode changes of LAP process centers in the 
“LAP” scenario.  There are no restrictions on the number or frequency of mode 
transitions.  The model makes these transitions to minimize the cost.  In some cases it 
may be cheaper to transition state.  For instance, CRNLAP is initially in ACTGOGO 
state, and because the variable cost of CRNLAP process center in ACTFGC mode is 
much less than it is in ACTGOGO mode, it changes to ACTFGC mode immediately for 
year ‘y05’.  Then in year ‘y06’ it becomes an ACTGOGO again.  Going from 
ACTGOGO to INACTGOGO is much cheaper for CRNLAP than it is going from 
ACTFGC to INACTFGC, and being in INACTFGC or INACTGOGO for the rest of the 
horizon is the same price.  Some of the process centers are disposed after year ‘y10’ 
because of “end effects” (i.e. this is the cheapest alternative and there is no following 
demand). 
 
By using “turbulence” constraints (TI, TS, TP, and TM) we can restrict the 
number of mode changes of each installation, each structure and each process center to 
one (See Table 5) in our planning horizon. 
 
Process C. y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10
CRNLAP ACTGOGO ACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO
IOWALAP ACTGOCO ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC
KANSLAP INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO
LAKECLAP ACTGOCO ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC
LNSTLAP ACTGOCO ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC ACTFGC
MILLAP ACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO INACTGOCO
PBLFLAP ACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO 
Table 5.   LAP Process Centers Management Modes Optimized over Time with at most one 
Allowable Mode Transition 
This table depicts the mode changes of LAP process centers over time when we restrict 
the number of mode changes of each installation, structure and process center to be no 
more than one.  This more practical solution (a restriction of the prior scenario) only 





Further, movement and operation (in shifts) of process centers, and any 
unavoidable peacetime and replenishment requirement shortages (See Table 6) are also 
specified.  For each process type the report includes the costs (See Figure 6) associated 
with each one of these actions over a 10-year planning horizon. 
 
Process Type y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10
bombfill 15 28 40 54 65 80 92
canmanu 14 32 47 61 76 90 105
chemic 14 31 47 63 78 92 106
explos 14 31 48 64 78 91 104
LAP 4 10 14 19 26 33 40
manu 17 30 46 64 80 98 115
metpart 17 32 48 66 85 101 120
propelman 17 33 46 62 75 90 105
TNT 14 27 42 56 72 88 106    
Process Type y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10
bombfill 15 28 40 54 65 80 92
canmanu 14 32 47 61 76 90 105
chemic 14 31 47 63 78 92 106
explos 14 31 48 64 78 91 104
LAP 0 0 0 0 0 0
manu 17 30 46 64 80 98 115
metpart 17 32 48 66 85 101 120
propelman 17 33 46 62 75 90 105
TNT 14 27 42 56 72 88 106
0
 
Table 6.   Cumulative Peacetime Requirement Shortages (K tons) of Process Types over 
Time 
Initially, the model is solved fixing each installation, structure and process center to its 
current state.  We assume that process centers are working one shift a day and five days a 
week--- a total of 260 shifts a year.  Currently, none of the process type requirements can 
be met by the process centers.  The table on the left represents the cumulative peacetime 
requirement shortages over time if every entity in the model is fixed to its current status.  
In the “LAP” scenario (the table on the right) the demands for peacetime load, assemble, 
and pack (LAP) of ammunition and ordnance items are met with the data used.  Because 
non-LAP process centers are fixed, the model still shows the fixed, exogenous shortages 
for other process types. 
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Figure 6.   A Comparison of Current vs. Optimized Annual Fixed Costs of Installations 
This graph shows the annual fixed possession and operating costs of AAPs and arsenals if 
they are retained in their present state and if costs are minimized by changing state at 
most once per entity over the planning horizon.  Here, the “end effects” of disposing all 
entities at the end of the planning horizon have been eliminated by precluding any last-
period disposal.  These costs include the cost of mode transitions and the movement cost 
of process centers. 
 
In summary, we can see each action an installation, a structure, and/or a process 
center (See Table 7) takes. 
 
CRNLAP y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10
Operation Mode ACTGOGO ACTFGC ACTGOGO ACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO INACTGOGO
Housing Structure CRNSTRA CRNSTRA PBLFSTRA PBLFSTRA PBLFSTRA PBLFSTRA PBLFSTRA
Shifts 260 1092 260 260 0 0 0  
Table 7.   Example of an Optimized Ten-Year History of a Process Center 
Initially CRNLAP process center is in CRNSTRA (Crane AAP Structure A) and stays 
there for one more year.  In year ‘y06’ it moves to PBLFSTRA (Pine Bluff Arsenal 
Structure A) and stays there for the rest of the planning horizon.  The operation mode of 







We think this model captures the essence of the Army’s problem.  We 
recommend the Army try it. 
CAA's LTC Bill Tarantino [2002a] says that “The model introduced here will 
potentially be used in the Army’s Industrial Base Review led by the Army Material 
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